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The Economic Sociology of Capitalism. Edited by Victor Nee and Richard
Swedberg. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005. Pp.
xlvii457. $65.00 (cloth); $26.95 (paper).
Frank Dobbin
Harvard University
The Economic Sociology of Capitalism might have been titled The So-
ciology of Economic Institutions. The chapters, presented at Cornell in
September 2001, catalog current thinking about how institutions lead to
regularities in economic behavior. They deﬁne institutions variously as
cognitive frameworks, social networks, and regulatory parameters that
create opportunities and constrain behavior.
Avner Greif’s lucid forward introduces the varieties of institutionalism,
all of them oriented to explaining the varieties of capitalism. Game theory
is the point of departure, and it is to game theory that institutional ap-
proaches in sociology and political science are contrasted. In their slim
introduction to the volume Victor Nee and Richard Swedberg do not take
strong sides in the debate about how to conceptualize institutions; rather
they point to the range of conceptions, sketch the intellectual antecedents
of some of those conceptions, and then open the ﬂoor for debate.
Swedberg’s own chapter, subtitled “An Introduction and an Agenda,”
begins the debate with a compelling call for a sociological perspective on
interest. Sociologists have focused on social relations in explaining eco-
nomic behavior, and thus have developed one-sided models that neglect
interest—perhaps because economists had staked that terrain. As a result
we do not have a truly sociological theory of interest.
Both Douglass North and Francis Fukuyama point to gaps in the eco-
nomic model that sociology might ﬁll; even institutionalists within eco-
nomics are ahistorical and fail to consider the possibility of multiple,
roughly equal equilibria—alternative ways of organizing economies ef-
fectively. If there is more than one way to skin a cat—if all economies
are not converging on the one best way—then institutions deserve more
attention. For North, market incentives and state regulatory institutions
explain why different corporate forms might prosper in different settings.
Nee argues that North is too sanguine about the adaptability of ﬁrms.
China’s ﬁrms did not readily adapt to changing market and regulatory
conditions—inertia won out. Peter Evans introduces three new institu-
tional theories of development from economists that draw on sociological
concepts.
Together, the seven theoretical and programmatic pieces at the front
of the volume present sociological and economic institutionalism by tri-
angulation—or septangulation. Both disciplines trace regularities in eco-
nomic behavior to institutions. While economists have not given up the
rational actor model, they have argued that history, as it is crystallized
in institutions, shapes rational action. Sociologists continue to see self-American Journal of Sociology
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interested rational action as socially constructed, and hence as explan-
andum rather than explanans, but they now pay attention to interest as
motive, or they should do so.
Parts 2 (“Institutions of American Capitalism”) and 3 (“Global Trans-
formation and Institutional Change”) reprise recent work by some of the
most creative and insightful sociologists around. The value added is not
trivial, for authors step back to discuss the wider implications of their
studies. These chapters are both inspiring, for their insight and their
common vision of institutions and institutional change, and frustrating,
for their lack of a cumulative view of the project of economic sociology
and (relatedly) for their lack of a common vocabulary. Sociologists have
not arrived at the sort of consensus on conceptual models and terminology
that the “queen of the social sciences” should have, or that the king has
had since Paul Samuelson pulled it all together in the years after World
War II.
The chapters catalog sociology’s rich and creative insights about eco-
nomic institutions. Three chapters describe how formal institutions struc-
ture markets. Neil Fligstein’s model of corporate strategy resembles the
Nee and North models in its focus on market competition and regulatory
institutions; what distinguishes Fligstein’s model is that managers are
interested in ﬁrm stability rather than proﬁts, though seeingashetheorizes
that interest is historically constructed, perhaps stability has been super-
seded. John Freeman sketches the institutional preconditions for the rise
of a venture capital industry, expanding the ecological paradigm to con-
sider institutions and bridging a structural hole between ecologists and
the rest of economic sociology. Mary Brinton compares school-to-work
institutions, ﬁnding that the Japanese system of school-employer coor-
dination does not work so well in hard times for those with hard luck.
The arguments here differ from those of Nee and North, but authors do
not say exactly where they differ or what they add.
Three chapters take up Nee’s theme of institutional inertia. James
Baron and Mike Hannan ﬁnd that Silicon Valley start-up ﬁrms preserve
the preferences of their founders and initial venture capitalists long after
both have gone. Gerald Davis and Christopher Marquis ask whether
foreign ﬁrms that list on the American stockmarketadopttheshareholder-
value governance practices favored by American investors and regulators.
Inertia prevents change, though ﬁrms that recruit American directors
make some changes. John Campbell looks for convergence in national
tax policies under global competition. Inertia wins here as well,butCamp-
bell’s explanation is that managers and investors recognize comparative
advantages in institutional arrangements and will pay higher taxes for
them. These chapters revive ideas about institutional inertia from the
work of Philip Selznick, Mayer Zald, Burton Clark, and Arthur Stinch-
combe, and they resonate with Nee’s ﬁndings. But we have to make out
the value added by each piece for ourselves.
Three chapters represent the growing cadre exploring the cognitive andBook Reviews
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affective underpinnings of economic institutions. Mitchel Abolaﬁa uses
Karl Weick’s sense-making approach to study the Federal ReserveBank’s
Open Market Committee, whose members do a lot of post hoc sense
making of their own activities and of the machinations of the economy.
Institutions provide the frameworks for individual sense making, and
structured sense making reinforces institutions. Ko Kuwabara asks why
participants altruistically provide feedback on eBay. Affectiveattachment
to a virtual social world is at work alongside rational calculation. Viviana
Zelizer examines the relationship between capitalist “circuits” and social
relations, with the cases of caring work and local currencies, to argue
against the academic bifurcation of the rational economic world and the
intimate social world. Circuits of relations, as anthopologists deﬁne them,
tie these realms together.
Two chapters deal with networks as institutions. Paul DiMaggio and
Joseph Cohen enrich the economic theory of network externalities with
sociological insights about prestige and inequality, which shape and are
shaped by the diffusion of television and the Internet. Then AnnaLee
Saxenian shows that networks spanning SiliconValley,Taiwan,andChina
have led to high technology production sites in East Asia. As in Nee and
North’s world, markets and states matter, but here social networks(return
migration and long-standing social ties) are key as well.
If you squint at these chapters you can see the outline of a powerful
sociological model of how institutions shape economic institutions by pro-
viding cognitive frameworks, notions of interests, opportunities for en-
trepreneurialism, and constraints on feasible business strategies. Redun-
dant terms from different paradigms and a reluctance to trace the
intellectual roots of ideas have made this outline hard to see without
squinting, but the book provides the raw material for a very dynamic
future for economic sociology.
Open for Business: The Persistent Entrepreneurial Class in Poland.B y
Elizabeth Osborn and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski. Warsaw: IFiS Pub-
lishers, 2005. $28.50.
Lawrence King
University of Cambridge
Elizabeth Osborn and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski have produced a val-
uable work of interest to those studying postcommunism. The 11 sub-
stantive chapters feature a wealth of useful information, with empirical
analyses of various aspects of nonagricultural “entrepreneurship”(theself-
employed and small employers). The authors analyze numerous surveys
(including excellent panel data) to examine stratiﬁcation patterns as well
as entrepreneurial personality. There is also a nonstatistical content anal-
ysis of autobiographies of entrepreneurs published in a major Polishnews-